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Abstract
We consider a transmitter and K receivers, each of which shares a key variable with the
transmitter. Through a noiseless broadcast channel, the transmitter wishes to send a common
message W securely to N out of the K receivers while the remaining K − N receivers learn
no information about W . We are interested in the maximum message rate, i.e., the maximum
number of bits of W that can be securely groupcast to the legitimate receivers per key block
and the minimum broadcast bandwidth, i.e., the minimum number of bits of the broadcast
information required to securely groupcast the message bits.
We focus on the setting of combinatorial keys, where every subset of the K receivers share an
independent key of arbitrary size. Under this combinatorial key setting, the maximum message
rate is characterized for the following scenarios - 1) N = 1 or N = K−1, i.e., secure unicast to 1
receiver with K−1 eavesdroppers or secure groupcast to K−1 receivers with 1 eavesdropper, 2)
N = 2,K = 4, i.e., secure groupcast to 2 out of 4 receivers, and 3) the symmetric setting where
the key size for any subset of the same cardinality is equal for any N,K. Further, for the latter
two cases, the minimum broadcast bandwidth for the maximum message rate is characterized.
Hua Sun (email: hua.sun@unt.edu) is with the Department of Electrical Engineering at the University of North
Texas.
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1 Introduction
The first theoretical analysis of cryptography and secrecy system was carried out by Shannon
in the groundbreaking 1949 work [1], where the mathematical framework of information theoretic
security was introduced to establish the fundamental limits of secure point-to-point communication.
Shannon studied the one-time pad system (see Fig. 1.1), where Alice shares a key Z with Bob and
wishes to send an independent message W to Bob such that even if the transmit signal X is fully
eavesdropped by Eve, Eve cannot learn anything about W as long as Eve has no knowledge of the
key Z. The simple one-time pad scheme X = W +Z, where ‘+’ represents bit-wise binary addition
is proved information theoretically secure and communication-wise optimal in the following sense.
• To send one bit of the message W securely, one bit of the key Z must be shared. That is, the
maximum message rate is 1 bit per key bit.
• To send one bit of the message W securely, one bit of the transmit signal X must be broadcast
(seen by everyone). That is, the minimum broadcast bandwidth is 1 bit per message bit.
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Figure 1: 1) The one-time pad system. 2) The secure groupcast problem (to 2 out of 4 receivers).
In this work, motivated by the need of secure group (beyond point-to-point) communication
under complex adversarial scenario (beyond a single eavesdropper knowing nothing about the key),
we consider the following secure groupcast communication scenario. A transmitter shares a key
variable Zk, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K} with Receiver k and Zk may be arbitrarily correlated (see Fig. 1.2).
Aided by the shared keys, the transmitter wishes to send a common message W securely to N out
of the K receivers through broadcasting the signal X to all receivers, in a way that any one of the
remaining K −N receivers learns no information about W in the information theoretic sense.
This secure groupcast problem naturally generalizes Shannon’s one-time pad system, which
is a special case of secure unicast (N = 1) over a K = 2 receiver broadcast channel and the
eavesdropping receiver knows nothing about the key of the legitimate receiver. Following the
communication metrics considered by Shannon, we focus on the following two questions regarding
the fundamental limits of secure groupcast.
• What is the maximum message rate, defined as the maximum number of bits of the message
W that can be securely groupcast per key block (a classic Shannon theoretic formulation
where we may code over a long key block and the block size is allowed to approach infinity)?
• What is the minimum broadcast bandwidth, defined as the minimum number of bits of the
broadcast information X required to securely groupcast a message of certain rate?
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Beyond being an elemental model for information theoretic security, the above shared key secure
groupcast problem arises naturally in many applications, where we interpret the keys either as
digital tokens or information from memory devices (e.g., in premiere streaming or game distribu-
tion), or more generally as side-information variables that could be sensed from the environment
or obtained from prior communication (e.g., in wireless networking). In addition, the model can
be easily extended from groupcasting a single message for a single group to multiple messages,
each exclusively for an arbitrary group under various security constraints, i.e., the secure groupcast
model is introduced to enable broadcasting to a selected set of qualified receivers while unqualified
receivers obtain no useful information.
Combinatorial Key Setting
As an initial step, we mainly focus on the combinatorial key setting, where every subset U of the
K receivers share an independent key SU of arbitrary size. An example is shown in Fig. 2, where
S1 denotes the key that is known only to Receiver 1 (and the transmitter), S145 (abbreviation
of S{1,4,5} for simplicity) is known to Receiver 1, Receiver 4 and Receiver 5 etc. Further, the S
variables with different subscripts are independent of each other.
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Figure 2: A secure groupcast problem to 2 out of 5 receivers with combinatorial keys (i.e., the S variables
are independent). Z1:5 denotes (Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, Z5).
The combinatorial key setting turns out to be technically challenging due to the necessity of
highly structured coding of the message symbols and the key symbols (for which the setting in
Fig. 2 is a representative example even when the S variables all have the same size), and the
abundance of parameters (as the key size for different subsets may be different so that overall
the order of parameters is exponential in K). The essence is to accommodate for and utilize the
complex correlation among the keys so that legitimate receivers can decode the common message
while eavesdropping receivers cannot obtain anything from the correlated keys (i.e., need to avoid
leakage under multiple correlated views). Our results are summarized next.
Main Results and Techniques
The main results of this work include the exact characterization of the maximum message rate and
the minimum broadcast bandwidth for settings listed below.
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• N = 1, any K: This is the secure unicast setting, with only 1 desired receiver. Both the max-
imum message rate and the minimum broadcast bandwidth are characterized. The achievable
scheme is based on random linear coding over the key symbols. Refer to Theorem 3.
• N = K−1, any K: This can be viewed as the secure multicast setting, with only 1 eavesdrop-
per. The maximum message rate is characterized (and the minimum broadcast bandwidth
when K ≤ 4 or when the total secure key size is the same for all receivers). The achievable
scheme is based on random linear coding over the message symbols. Refer to Theorem 4.
• N = 2,K = 4: Both the maximum message rate and the minimum broadcast bandwidth are
characterized. The achievable scheme requires a delicate structured decomposition to basic
components according to the key sizes. Refer to Theorem 5.
• The symmetric setting for any N,K, where the size of the key SU only depends on |U| (i.e.,
the cardinality of the subset): Both the maximum message rate and the minimum broadcast
bandwidth are characterized. The achievable scheme requires an intricate coding over keys
from various subsets that handles correctness and security jointly. Refer to Theorem 6.
• The converse bounds on the message rate for all results above are given by a simple conditional
entropy term (refer to Theorem 1); the converse bounds on the broadcast bandwidth for
all results above have an interesting unified form that can be interpreted through common
information (refer to Theorem 2).
• The simple conditional entropy converse bound in Theorem 1 is not tight in general. Specifi-
cally, a stronger bound is derived for the setting in Fig. 2 when the S variables have the same
size and the maximum message rate is characterized with a matching vector linear coding
scheme (refer to Theorem 7).
We have also explored the generalization to the following scenarios.
• The rate region of secure groupcasting multiple messages. Specifically, we consider 2 legiti-
mate receivers with 3 desired messages (1 for each individual receiver so that the other receiver
learns nothing and a common message for both receivers) and all these 3 messages must be
kept fully secure to an eavesdropping receiver. Refer to Theorem 8.
• The discrete memoryless key setting. Interestingly, the scenarios where random linear codes
suffice for the combinatorial key setting (i.e., N = 1 and N = K − 1) generalize fully to
discrete memoryless keys by random binning. Refer to Theorem 9.
We start with the problem statement and defer the discussion of related prior work in key
agreement, latent capacity region, secure broadcasting, and secure index coding to Section 5.
Notation: For positive integers K1,K2,K1 ≤ K2, we use the notation [K1 : K2] = {K1,K1 +
1, · · · ,K2}. The notation |U| is used to denote the cardinality of a set U and the notation |X| is used
to denote the number of elements of a vector X. For a matrix V, V(i, j) represents the element
in the i-th row and j-th column. For two matrices V1,V2 (with the same number of columns),
[V1;V2] denotes the row stack of V1,V2. A binomial coefficient
(
K
U
)
is defined as 0 if K < U .
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2 Problem Statement
Define K discrete random variables z1, z2, · · · , zK of finite cardinality, drawn from an arbitrary
joint distribution Pz1,z2,··· ,zK . Following the convention, Z1, Z2, · · · , ZK denote L length extensions
of z1, z2, · · · , zK , i.e., Z1, Z2, · · · , ZK are sequences of length L, such that the sequence of tuples
[Z1(l), Z2(l), · · · , ZK(l)]Ll=1 is produced i.i.d. according to Pz1,z2,··· ,zK .
Consider a transmitter that knows the keys Z1, Z2, · · · , ZK , and K receivers such that Receiver
k knows Zk, k ∈ [1 : K]. The transmitter wishes to send a common message W securely to the first
N receivers, where 1 ≤ N ≤ K − 1. The message W consists of LW i.i.d. uniform symbols from a
finite field1 Fp for a prime power p, so H(W ) = LW log2 p bits. We assume that the message W is
independent of the key variables Z1, Z2, · · · , ZK .
I(W ;Z1, Z2, · · · , ZK) = 0. (1)
The communication channel is a noiseless broadcast channel, i.e., the transmit signal X is sent
by the transmitter and seen by every receiver. To securely groupcast the message W , the transmit
signal X consists of LX symbols from Fp.
From the transmit signal X and the key Zk, each legitimate receiver must be able to decode
the message W , with probability of error Pe. The probability of error must approach zero as the
key block length L approaches infinity2. From Fano’s inequality, we have
[Correctness] H(W |X,Zk) = o(L), ∀k ∈ [1 : N ] (2)
where any function of L, say f(L), is said to be o(L) if limL→∞ f(L)/L = 0. From the transmit
signal X and the key Zk, each eavesdropping receiver obtains a negligible amount of information
about the message W .
[Security] I(W ;X,Zk) = o(L), ∀k ∈ [N + 1 : K]. (3)
The groupcast rate characterizes how many bits of the message are securely groupcast per key
block, and is defined as follows.
R =
H(W )
L
=
LW log2 p
L
. (4)
A rate R is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of secure groupcast schemes (indexed by
L), each of rate greater or equal to R, for which Pe → 0 as L→∞ (i.e., the correctness constraint
(2) and the security constraint (3) are satisfied). The supremum of achievable rates is called the
capacity C.
The broadcast bandwidth β(R) characterizes how many bits of the transmit signal are broadcast
per key block to securely groupcast a message of rate R, and is defined as follows.
β(R) =
LX log2 p
L
. (5)
1As usual for an information theoretic formulation, the actual size of the message is allowed to approach infinity.
We allow the optimization of both parameters of the key block length L and the field size p, to match the code
dimensions and simplify the presentation of the coding scheme.
2If Pe is required to be exactly zero, then the o(L) term can be replaced with 0. The situation is similar if zero
leakage instead of vanishing leakage is required in the security constraint (3).
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The achievable broadcast bandwidth is defined similarly, i.e., broadcast bandwidth β(R) is said
to be achievable if there exists a sequence of secure groupcast schemes, each of rate greater than
or equal to R and each of broadcast bandwidth smaller than or equal to β(R), for which Pe → 0
as L → ∞. The infimum of achievable broadcast bandwidth is called the minimum broadcast
bandwidth β∗(R).
We will be mainly interested in the capacity, C and the minimum broadcast bandwidth when
the rate value is the capacity, β∗(C).
2.1 Combinatorial Keys
The combinatorial key setting refers to a specific type of joint distribution of the keys and is defined
as follows. Consider 2K − 1 independent random variables sU , where U may be any non-empty
subset of [1 : K]. For example, when K = 3, we have3 s1, s2, s3, s12, s13, s23, s123.
H(s1, s2, · · · , sU , · · · , s1:K) = H(s1) +H(s2) + · · ·+H(sU ) + · · ·+H(s1:K). (6)
We assume that sU consists of an integer number, say LU , of i.i.d. uniform symbols from Fp.
H(sU ) = LU log2 p bits. (7)
The variable zk is the collection of all sU variables such that k ∈ U .
zk = (sU : k ∈ U). (8)
For example, when K = 3, z2 = (s2, s12, s23, s123). The symmetric setting is defined as follows.
(symmetric setting) H(sU1) = H(sU2),∀U1,U2 such that |U1| = |U2|. (9)
The extension of the above system model to include multiple groupcast messages is immediate
and will be presented when we consider this generalization in Section 4.1.
3 Main Results
In this section, we summarize our main results along with illustrative examples and observations.
3.1 Converse on Rate R and Broadcast Bandwidth β(R)
We present a simple converse bound on the groupcast rate R in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 [Rate Converse] For any secure groupcast problem (to the first N of K receivers),
R ≤ H(zq|ze), ∀q ∈ [1 : N ],∀e ∈ [N + 1 : K]. (10)
The proof of Theorem 1 is presented in Section 6.1. The conditional entropy bound (10) is very
intuitive, because W must be decoded by any qualified Receiver q ∈ [1 : N ] and cannot be learned
by any eavesdropping Receiver e ∈ [N +1 : K]. Surprisingly, this simple conditional entropy bound
turns out to be tight for many settings of interest (see below). However, it is not sufficient in
general (refer to Remark 2 after Theorem 7).
Next, we present an interesting converse bound on the broadcast bandwidth β(R) in the fol-
lowing theorem.
3For sU , we may simplify the subscript when the elements of U are easy to list, e.g., we may write s{1,2} as s12.
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Theorem 2 [Broadcast Bandwidth Converse] For any secure groupcast problem (to the first N of
K receivers), consider any set of qualified receivers Q , {q1, · · · , q|Q|} ⊂ [1 : N ] and consider any
random variable ue that is a function of the key of an eavesdropping Receiver e ∈ [N + 1 : K], i.e.,
H(ue|ze) = 0.
β(R) ≥ |Q|R−
 |Q|∑
i=1
H(zqi |ue)−H(zq1 , zq2 , · · · , zq|Q| |ue)

= |Q|R−
|Q|−1∑
i=1
I(zq1 , · · · , zqi ; zqi+1 |ue). (11)
The proof of Theorem 2 is presented in Section 6.2. The negative term on the RHS of (11)
captures the benefits of correlated keys in reducing the broadcast bandwidth. On one extreme
when the keys are fully independent, this negative term is zero and we have to send the message
W to all |Q| qualified receivers one by one, so that the broadcast bandwidth is |Q| times of the
rate, R of the message, i.e., β(R) ≥ |Q|R. On the other extreme when the keys are identical and
independent of the key at the eavesdropping receiver (i.e., zq1 = · · · = zqQ), this negative term
becomes (|Q|−1)H(zq1). Now suppose R = H(zq1), then the broadcast bandwidth bound becomes
β(R) ≥ R and it might suffice to simply send out the one-time pad signal W + Zq1 . In general,
between the two extremes, the saving is given by the difference between the sum of individual
entropy of each key and the joint entropy of all keys, which can be interpreted as a form of common
information. Interestingly, this common information type of term can also be written as the sum
of a chain of mutual information terms.
Equipped with the above converse results, we are now ready to proceed to consider the combi-
natorial key setting, which is referred to as the combinatorial secure groupcast problem for short.
Note that for combinatorial secure groupcast, all achievable schemes satisfy zero error and zero
leakage (i.e., o(L) is replaced with 0 in (2), (3)).
3.2 Secure Unicast N = 1 and Secure Multicast N = K − 1 Settings
When there is only N = 1 desired receiver, secure groupcast reduces to secure unicast, and this
combinatorial secure unicast problem can be solved by random linear coding over the key symbols
for the achievability side and the bounds given above for the converse side. This result is presented
in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 [Secure Unicast] For the combinatorial secure unicast problem (to the first of K re-
ceivers), the capacity and the minimum broadcast bandwidth for capacity achieving schemes are
C = min
e∈[2:K]
H(z1|ze) = min
e∈[2:K]
∑
U⊂[1:K]:
1∈U ,e/∈U
H(sU ), (12)
β∗(C) = C. (13)
The proof of Theorem 3 is presented in Section 6.3. The achievability is based on creating a key
from what the legitimate Receiver 1 knows so that any one of the K − 1 eavesdropping receivers
cannot learn anything about the created key. This key can be created by random linear coding
and after the key is created, one-time pad coding suffices to achieve the capacity and the minimum
broadcast bandwidth. An example is presented below to explain this idea.
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Example 1 Consider a combinatorial secure unicast instance with K = 4 receivers, where the key
configurations are given as follows.
z1 = (s12, s13, s14, s134), z2 = (s12), z3 = (s13, s134), z4 = (s14, s134); (14)
H(s12) = 4 log2 p, H(s13) = 2 log2 p, H(s14) = log2 p, H(s134) = 3 log2 p. (15)
For example, s12 ∈ F4×1p contains 4 symbols from Fp. From Theorem 3, we have
C = min
(
H(s13) +H(s14) +H(s134), H(s12) +H(s14), H(s12) +H(s13)
)
= 5 log2 p, (16)
β∗(C) = C = 5 log2 p. (17)
The converse follows immediately from Theorem 1 (taking the minimum converse bound over all
eavesdropping receivers) and Theorem 2 (taking Q = {1} so that β(R) ≥ R). The achievable
scheme is presented next. Consider L = 1 block of the keys (then Zk = zk) and we wish to send
LW = 5 message symbols from Fp by broadcasting LX = 5 symbols, i.e., W,X are both 5×1 vectors
over Fp. The combinatorial key variables are each precoded by a beamforming matrix to produce a
mixed key, which is then added with the message W to produce the transmit signal X.
X = W +V12s12 +V13s13 +V14s14 +V134s134 (18)
where the precoding matrices have 5 rows each and the number of columns matches the dimension
of the key variables, e.g., V12 ∈ F5×4p . The correctness constraint (2) is trivially satisfied. For
eavesdropping Receiver 2, after canceling the known key, he can recover
W +V13s13 +V14s14 +V134s134 = W +
[
V13 V14 V134
] s13s14
s134
 (19)
so that in order to make sure nothing is revealed, we need
[V13 V14 V134]5×6 to have full rank (Receiver 2). (20)
Similarly, we need [V12 V14]5×5 to have full rank (Receiver 3) (21)
and [V12 V13]5×6 to have full rank (Receiver 4). (22)
That is, we simply need the matrices to have full rank, which is easily satisfied by generic MDS
matrices, e.g., Cauchy matrices over a properly large field. The details are deferred to the proof
presented in Section 6.3. Finally, the rate and broadcast bandwidth achieved match the converse.
We next consider the (somewhat) dual of secure unicast (a single legitimate receiver and any
number of eavesdroppers) - secure multicast (a single eavesdropper and any number of legitimate
receivers), whose capacity is solved by a similar random linear coding idea (but over the message
symbols instead of over the key symbols). This result is presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 [Secure Multicast] For the combinatorial secure multicast problem (to the first K − 1
of K receivers), the capacity is
C = min
q∈[1:K−1]
H(zq|zK) = min
q∈[1:K−1]
∑
U⊂[1:K−1]:q∈U
H(sU ). (23)
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Further, the minimum broadcast bandwidth for capacity achieving schemes is characterized in the
following two cases.
1. H(z1|zK) = · · · = H(zK−1|zK) : β∗(C) =
∑
U⊂[1:K−1]
H(sU ). (24)
2. K = 4 (assume H(z1|z4) ≤ min
(
H(z2|z4), H(z3|z4)
)
, H(s12) ≤ H(s13) with no loss) :
β∗(C) = H(s123) + max
(
2H(s1) +H(s12) + 2H(s13), 3H(s1) + 2H(s12) + 2H(s13)−H(s23)
)
.
(25)
The proof of Theorem 4 is presented in Section 6.4. To achieve the capacity, we simply generate
random linear combinations of the message symbols and mix them with each of the combinatorial
keys. Each legitimate receiver can decode the message after collecting a sufficient number of coded
message symbols. This idea is explained in the following example.
Example 2 Consider a combinatorial secure multicast instance with K = 4 receivers, where the
key configurations are given as follows.
z1 = (s1, s13), z2 = (s23), z3 = (s13, s23), z4 = (); (26)
H(s1) = log2 p, H(s13) = 2 log2 p, H(s23) = 3 log2 p. (27)
From Theorem 4, we have
C = min
(
H(s1) +H(s13), H(s23), H(s13) +H(s23)
)
= 3 log2 p, (28)
β∗(C) = max
(
2H(s1) + 2H(s13), 3H(s1) + 2H(s13)−H(s23)
)
= 6 log2 p. (29)
The rate converse is simply given by the minimum entropy of the legitimate key variables (and
follows from Theorem 1). The broadcast bandwidth converse is given by Theorem 2, where Q =
{1, 2} and ue = () so that β(C) ≥ 2C − I(z1; z2) = 2C. The achievable scheme is presented next.
Consider L = 1 and W ∈ F3×1p . The transmit signal X ∈ F6×1p is produced as follows.
X =
 V1W + s1V13W + s13
V23W + s23
 (30)
where the dimensions of the precoding matrices are specified as V1 ∈ F1×3p ,V13 ∈ F2×3p ,V23 ∈ F3×3p .
For the secure multicast problem, security is trivial as the keys known by the eavesdropping receiver
are never used and correctness requires that
[V1;V13] has full rank (Receiver 1), [V23] has full rank (Receiver 2), (31)
and [V13;V23] has full rank (Receiver 3). (32)
The above constraints can be satisfied by generic (e.g., Cauchy or any MDS) matrices and details
are deferred to the full proof presented in Section 6.4.
Remark 1 While the capacity of secure multicast is solved simply by random linear codes, the
minimum broadcast bandwidth for capacity achieving schemes is generally an open problem (e.g.,
when K ≥ 5). When K ≤ 4, we need to analyze carefully which combinatorial key has redundancy
and quantify the amount so as to use only the minimum required (see Section 6.4.1).
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Interestingly, the above random coding idea for both combinatorial secure unicast and secure
multicast generalizes to the discrete memoryless key setting, where corresponding results are ob-
tained using standard existing random binning arguments (see Theorem 9).
3.3 Secure Groupcast to N = 2 of K = 4 Receivers
The capacity and minimum broadcast bandwidth for the combinatorial secure groupcast problem
to 2 out of 4 receivers are characterized in the following theorem.
Theorem 5 [N = 2,K = 4] For the combinatorial secure groupcast problem to the first N = 2 of
K = 4 receivers, the capacity is
C = min
q∈{1,2},e∈{3,4}
H(zq|ze) = H(s12) + min
(
H(s1) +H(s14) +H(s124), H(s1) +H(s13) +H(s123),
H(s2) +H(s24) +H(s124), H(s2) +H(s23) +H(s123)
)
(33)
and the minimum broadcast bandwidth for capacity achieving schemes is
β∗(C) = 2C −H(s12)−min
(
H(s123), H(s124)
)
. (34)
The proof of Theorem 5 is presented in Section 6.5. The complexity mainly lies in the abun-
dance of the parameters so that we need to decompose the problem instance into multiple basic
components (also how to identify basic components) and depending on the key configurations, there
are many case studies. To this end, we need a decomposition result of two achievable schemes with
two independent sets of keys, stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Consider two sets of independent keys (Z
[1]
1 , · · · , Z [1]K ) and (Z [2]1 , · · · , Z [2]K ) such that L[1]W
and L
[2]
W symbols of the messages W
[1],W [2] can be securely groupcast with L
[1]
X and L
[2]
X symbols of
the transmit signals X [1], X [2], respectively. Then we can concatenate the two schemes to one such
that the keys are Zk = (Z
[1]
k , Z
[2]
k ), k ∈ [1 : K], LW = L[1]W + L[2]W symbols of W = (W [1],W [2]) are
securely groupcast with LX = L
[1]
X + L
[2]
X symbols of X = (X
[1], X [2]).
Proof: The proof is almost immediate. As long as each component scheme is correct and secure,
the concatenated scheme will be correct and secure as the keys are independent and the message
and transmit signal symbols are also independent. Further, this concatenation generalizes trivially
to any number of independent key sets.
We are now ready to give an example of the combinatorial secure groupcast problem to 2 of 4
receivers, to illustrate the main idea.
Example 3 Consider a combinatorial secure groupcast instance to 2 of 4 receivers, where the key
configurations are given as follows. Remember that zk = (sU : k ∈ U), k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
(H(s1), H(s2), H(s13), H(s14), H(s23), H(s24), H(s123), H(s124)) = (1, 2, 2, 3, 1, 2, 2, 1). (35)
From Theorem 5, we have
C = min
q∈{1,2},e∈{3,4}
H(zq|ze) = min(5, 5, 5, 5) = 5, (36)
β∗(C) = 2C − 0−min(2, 1) = 9. (37)
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The rate converse follows from the conditional entropy bound in Theorem 1 and the broadcast
bandwidth converse follows from Theorem 2 by setting Q = {1, 2} and ue = z3 or z4. The achievable
scheme is shown in the following figure, where we decompose the instance into 3 sub-networks. We
operate over the binary field F2, i.e., p = 2 and key block size is L = 1. The total number of bits
in the message and the transmit signal match the converse above (5 and 9, respectively). All key
bits are used, e.g., H(s14) = 3 so that we have 3 bits of s14, and sub-network 1 uses 1 bit and
sub-network 3 uses 2 bits (see Fig. 6). Correctness and security are easy to verify.
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1CCA
3)
(s123)
(s124)
Figure 3: The 3 sub-networks, where the variables are independent for different sub-networks. When some
variable has 2 symbols, it is denoted as W = (W1;W2) ,W1:2, s13 = (s[1]13 ; s
[2]
13) , s
[1:2]
13 etc.
3.4 Secure Groupcast: Symmetric Setting
We consider now the symmetric setting, where the key size only depends on the cardinality of the set
of the receivers that have the same key. For any set U ⊂ [1 : K] with cardinality |U| = u, u ∈ [1 : K],
we denote the key size as H(sU ) = L[u] log2 p. The capacity and minimum broadcast bandwidth
for the symmetric setting are characterized in the following theorem.
Theorem 6 [Symmetric Setting] For the symmetric combinatorial secure groupcast problem (to the
first N of K receivers), the capacity and the minimum broadcast bandwidth for capacity achieving
schemes are
C =
K∑
u=1
(
K − 2
u− 1
)
L[u] log2 p, β
∗(C) =
K∑
u=1
((
K − 1
u
)
−
(
K −N − 1
u
))
L[u] log2 p. (38)
We refer to a key that is known to u receivers as a u-key. From the capacity and broadcast
bandwidth formula, we see that it suffices to consider u-keys separately for distinct u values, i.e.,
joint coding across different u-keys is not necessary. This is generally not true (e.g., see Fig. 6.1)
and greatly simplifies the problem. After we notice this simplification (we may limit to only u-keys
of one u value), the problem still requires an intricate decomposition of the keys, depending on
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how many qualified receivers and how many eavesdropping receivers know the key. An example is
presented below to illustrate the main idea and the full proof is presented in Section 6.6.
Example 4 Consider a symmetric combinatorial secure groupcast instance to N = 3 of K = 6
receivers, where we only have 3-keys, i.e.,
(
6
3
)
keys of the same length L[3] = 1.
From Theorem 6, we have
C =
(
4
2
)
log2 p = 6 log2 p, β
∗(C) =
(
5
3
)
log2 p = 10 log2 p. (39)
The rate converse follows from the conditional entropy bound in Theorem 1, where we may pick
any qualified receiver and any eavesdropping receiver such that the qualified receiver knows
(
4
2
)
keys
that are not known to the eavesdropping receiver. The broadcast bandwidth converse follows from
Theorem 2 by setting Q = [1 : 3] and ue = z6 so that β(C) ≥ H(z1, z2, z3|z6) =
(
5
3
)
log2 p.
The achievability is designed based on dividing the 3-keys into 3 groups.
1. The first group involves the key that is known only to 3 qualified receivers, i.e., s123. As s123
is not known to the eavesdropping receivers, we simply send 1 message symbol with 1 symbol
of one-time pad transmit signal, i.e., we have achieved R1 = β[1](R1) = log2 p.
2. The second group involves the keys that are known to 2 qualified receivers and 1 eavesdropping
receiver. We need to further divide these keys depending on the set of 2 qualified receivers.
Suppose the set of qualified receivers is {1, 2}, i.e., we are considering the keys (s124, s125, s126)
that are common to qualified Receiver 1 and qualified Receiver 2. Further, any eavesdropping
receiver only knows 1 key from (s124, s125, s126). In other words, we have the secure unicast
situation (note that here Receiver 1 and Receiver 2 both require the same message and hold
the same key) where the desired receiver has 4 equal-size combinatorial key variables while the
eavesdropping receivers have 1 combinatorial key each. Therefore, combining generic linear
coding ideas for key symbols in Theorem 3 and for message symbols in Theorem 4, we can
send 3− 1 = 2 symbols securely to Receiver 1 and Receiver 2 by transmitting
X2,12 = Vw12W
2 +Vs124s124 +V
s
125s125 +V
s
126s126 (40)
where Vs124,V
s
125,V
s
126 ∈ F2×1p and Vw12 ∈ F2×4p (the reason of setting this size will be
clear soon). We repeat the same coding procedure for the other
(
3
2
) − 1 = 2 sets of keys,
i.e., (s134, s135, s136) (common keys to qualified Receiver 1 and qualified Receiver 3) and
(s234, s235, s236) (common to Receiver 2 and Receiver 3).
X2,13 = Vw13W
2 +Vs134s134 +V
s
135s135 +V
s
136s136 (41)
X2,23 = Vw23W
2 +Vs234s234 +V
s
235s235 +V
s
236s236 (42)
where Vs ∈ F2×1p ,Vw ∈ F2×4p . From the transmit signal X2 = (X2,12, X2,13, X2,23), each
qualified receiver can obtain 4 generic desired message combinations (so the size of Vw is
chosen to match this total number of combinations), from which 4 symbols of W 2 can be
recovered as long as the Vw matrices are chosen in a generic manner. For example, qualified
Receiver 1 can obtain (Vw12W
2,Vw13W
2). Security is guaranteed as long as the Vs matrices
are chosen generically so that eavesdropping receivers see a sufficiently number of generic key
combinations. To sum up, the overall rate and broadcast bandwidth achieved for all keys in
the second group are
R2 =
(
3− 1
2− 1
)
2 log2 p = 4 log2 p, β
2(R2) =
(
3
2
)
2 log2 p = 6 log2 p. (43)
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3. The third group involves the keys that are known to 1 qualified receiver and 2 eavesdrop-
ping receivers. We need to further divide these keys depending on the identity of the qual-
ified receiver. Suppose the qualified receiver is Receiver 1, i.e., we are considering the keys
(s145, s146, s156) such that any eavesdropping receiver knows 2 of these 3 keys (e.g., eavesdrop-
ping Receiver 4 knows s145, s146). From the result of secure unicast (refer to Theorem 3), we
can achieve R = β(R) = (2 − 1) log2 p = log2 p for these 3 keys. Repeat the same procedure
for (s245, s246, s256) and (s345, s346, s356). The overall rate and broadcast bandwidth achieved
for all keys in the third group are
R3 = log2 p, β
3(R3) = 3 log2 p. (44)
Finally, we combine the performance of all 3 groups (using Lemma 1 for independent keys), so the
total rate and broadcast bandwidth achieved are
R = R1 +R2 +R3 = 6 log2 p, β(R) = β
1(R1) + β2(R2) + β3(R3) = 10 log2 p (45)
which match the converse.
3.5 A Secure Groupcast Instance with N = 2, K = 5
For all capacity results presented above, the conditional entropy converse bound in Theorem 1 turns
out to be tight. We wonder if the bound is always tight. Along this line, we find that the answer
is negative. We identify a simplest setting of combinatorial secure groupcast instance to N = 2 of
K = 5 receivers (note that all settings with smaller N,K values are settled by the converse bound
in Theorem 1) where a strictly stronger converse is required. The setting turns out to be that in
Fig. 2 and is redrawn here with simplified notations (refer to Fig. 4). We have characterized its
capacity and minimum broadcast bandwidth, and this result is presented in the following theorem.
W
W^
W^
Rx 1
Rx 2
Rx 3
Rx 4
W^
W^
X
X
X
X
X
W^
Rx 5
X
Tx
(a; ´ ´ ´ ; e)
(a; b; c)
(b; d; e)
(b)
(c; d)
(c; e)
X =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
W1 + b1 + c1
W4 + b2 + c2
W2 + a1
W3 + a2
W5 + a3
W1 + b1 + d1
W2 + b3 + d2
W3 + d3 + e1
W4 + b2 + e2
W5 + b3 + e3
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
Figure 4: A combinatorial secure groupcast instance to 2 of 5 receivers. The keys a, b, c, d, e are independent
and each key has 1 bit per block. The message has 5 bits, W = (W1, · · · ,W5), sent over 3 key blocks so that
each key has 3 bits, e.g., a = (a1, a2, a3). The broadcast signal X has 10 bits.
Theorem 7 For the combinatorial secure groupcast instance in Fig. 4, the capacity and the mini-
mum broadcast bandwidth for capacity achieving schemes are
C = 5/3, β∗(C) = 10/3. (46)
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The achievable scheme is shown in Fig. 4. Correctness is easy to verify, e.g., qualified Receiver
1 knows a, b, c such that from the first 5 rows of the transmit signal X, he can obtain all message
bits (W1,W2,W3,W4,W5). Security is more interesting. Eavesdropping Receiver 3 learns nothing
because even if b is known, all message bits in X are protected by c, a, d, e (not known to Receiver
3). Eavesdropping Receiver 4 knows c, d and after canceling c, d, he can obtain W1 + b1,W4 +
b2,W1 + b1,W2 + b3 that contains b. However, nothing is leaked because the first term is the same
as the third term (highlighted in blue). In fact, this is the key of the design. Therefore,
I(W ;X, c, d)
(1)
= I(W ;X|c, d) (47)
= H(X|c, d)−H(X|W, c, d) = 9− 9 = 0. (48)
The situation for eavesdropping Receiver 5 is similar, where the same noise of b2 (noise alignment)
appears in the same red signal W4 + b2 (signal alignment). Interestingly, similar alignment view
has been proved useful recently in several other security and privacy primitives [2–4].
We now discuss the rate converse. Here we give an intuitive argument for linear schemes,
which guides the design of the achievable scheme, and defer the information theoretic proof to
Section 6.7, which is based on the sub-modularity property of entropy functions. Consider qualified
Receiver 1, who knows only a, b, c and can decode W . Then W must be fully recoverable from
the key variables a, b, c in X. As a is only known to Receiver 1, it can easily be used to transmit
L message bits. Then to achieve rate R, the message bits carried by b, c must be (R − 1)L bits.
As b and c are known to eavesdropping Receiver 3 and eavesdropping Receiver 4, respectively, the
(R − 1)L message bits must be protected by both b and c. Denote these (R − 1)L dimensions
of b as B1. Now consider qualified Receiver 2, who knows b, d, e such that there must exist RL
dimensional space of W that is covered by b, d, e. These RL dimensions must be fully covered by
d, e as b is known to eavesdropping Receiver 3. As d, e have dimension L each, their overlap is
(2−R)L and each of them separately covers 12(R− (2−R))L = (R− 1)L dimensions. Therefore,
eavesdropping Receiver 4 can fully recover the (R − 1)L dimensions covered only by d (and b) as
d is known. This (R − 1)L dimensional space of b is denoted as B2. Symmetrically, the (R − 1)L
space of b (mixed with e) after e is known is denoted as B3. Finally, we connect B1, B2, B3. The
desired message bits in B2, B3 are independent, so B1 ∩ (B2 ∩B3) = ∅. Otherwise, in B1, we have
the same b space (B2 ∩ B3) mixed with different desired message bits (security violated). Then
L ≥ dim(B1) + dim(B2∩B3) ≥ (R−1)L+ (2(R−1)−1)L = (3R−4)L, and 3R ≤ 5. We note that
the translation of this linear argument into an information theoretic proof with entropy terms is
highly non-trivial. The converse for the broadcast bandwidth is immediate, by setting Q = {1, 2}
and4 ue = z3 = b in Theorem 2: β(C) ≥ 2C − I(a, b, c; b, d, e|b) = 2C − I(a, c; d, e|b) = 2C = 10/3.
Remark 2 The conditional entropy converse bound in Theorem 1 is R ≤ 2 for the secure groupcast
instance in Fig. 4, which is strictly weaker than the capacity 5/3. Thus the conditional entropy
converse bound is not tight in general, for combinatorial secure groupcast (and for secure groupcast).
4 Generalizations
In this section, to show how insights generalize, we consider two extensions of the basic combinato-
rial secure groupcast model - the first one includes multiple messages and in the second one, keys
are discrete memoryless sources.
4Here we slightly abuse the notation. Note that in ue, e denotes the index of an eavesdropping receiver and not
the combinatorial key e in the secure groupcast instance.
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4.1 Secure Groupcasting Multiple Messages
We consider an elementary 3 receiver broadcast network with 3 messages (see Fig. 5).
Rx 1
Rx 2
Rx 3
Z1
Z2
Z3
X
X
X
X
Tx
W1;W2;W12
= (S1; S12)
= (S2; S12)
= ()
W^1; W^2; W^12
W^1; W^12; W^2
W^2; W^12; W^1
(S1; S2; S12)
Figure 5: A secure groupcast problem with 3 messages and 3 receivers.
We first succinctly describe the model, which generalizes that in Section 2. A transmitter wishes
to deliver 3 messages W1,W2,W12 (of size LW1 , LW2 , LW12 i.i.d. uniform bits, respectively) through
broadcasting a signal X of size LX bits such that Receiver 1 only learns W1,W12, Receiver 2 only
learns W2,W12, and Receiver 3 learns nothing. Receiver 1 is equipped with key Z1 = (S1, S12),
Receiver 2 is equipped with key Z2 = (S2, S12) and Receiver 3’s key is empty. The key variables
S1, S2, S12 are L length extensions of uniform bits s1, s2, s12 (of size L1, L2, L12 bits, respectively).
H(W1,W2,W12, s1, s2, s12) = H(W1) +H(W2) +H(W12) +H(s1) +H(s2) +H(s12). (49)
The correctness and security constraints are as follows.
(Receiver 1) H(W1,W12|X,S1, S12) = o(L), I(W2;X,S1, S12) = o(L) (50)
(Receiver 2) H(W2,W12|X,S2, S12) = o(L), I(W1;X,S2, S12) = o(L) (51)
(Receiver 3) I(W1,W2,W12;X) = o(L). (52)
The rate of the messages and the broadcast bandwidth are defined as follows.
R1 =
LW1
L
, R2 =
LW2
L
, R12 =
LW12
L
, β(R1, R2, R12) =
LX
L
. (53)
The closure of the set of achievable rate tuples (R1, R2, R12) is called the capacity region C and the
minimum broadcast bandwidth for a rate tuple (R1, R2, R12) is denoted as β
∗(R1, R2, R12).
We present the capacity region and the minimum broadcast bandwidth for the 3 message secure
groupcast problem in Fig. 5 in the following theorem.
Theorem 8 [Rate Region] For the 3 message combinatorial secure groupcast problem in Fig. 5,
the capacity region and the minimum broadcast bandwidth are
0 ≤ R1 +R12 ≤ H(s1) +H(s12) (54)
0 ≤ R2 +R12 ≤ H(s2) +H(s12) (55)
0 ≤ R1 ≤ H(s1) (56)
0 ≤ R2 ≤ H(s2) (57)
β∗(R1, R2, R12) = R1 +R2 + max(R12, 2R12 −H(s12)). (58)
The proof of Theorem 8 is presented in Section 6.8.
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4.2 Discrete Memoryless Keys
The results for secure unicast and multicast with combinatorial keys generalize to discrete memo-
ryless keys and are presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 9 [Secure Unicast and Multicast under Discrete Memoryless Keys] For the secure unicast
problem (to the first of K receivers), the capacity and the minimum broadcast bandwidth for capacity
achieving schemes are
C = β∗(C) = min
e∈[2:K]
H(z1|ze). (59)
For the secure multicast problem (to the first K − 1 of K receivers), the capacity is
C = min
q∈[1:K−1]
H(zq|zK). (60)
The converse proof of Theorem 9 is identical to that under the combinatorial key setting.
The achievability proof of Theorem 9 is presented in Section 6.9. We give an intuitive overview
here. First, consider secure unicast. Based on z1, we wish to generate a key that is secure to
any eavesdropping Receiver e ∈ [2 : K]. With a discrete memoryless source, we can use random
binning (whose mapping does not depend on z2, · · · , zK) to obtain H(z1|ze)L + o(L) secure bits
over L key blocks. This step is well known and is typically referred to as privacy amplification [5]
(refer to Lemma 5 in Section 6.9 for a technical description). Given these secure bits, the rate
value of the capacity is easily achieved by one-time pad coding. Second, consider secure mul-
ticast, which is similar, but with an additional step of communication for omniscience [6] (well
known as well). This is implemented as follows. We assume the key ZK known by the eaves-
dropping Receiver K is globally known (e.g., the transmitter may broadcast ZK to everyone).
Next we wish to make the qualified receivers 1 to K − 1 all know Z1, · · · , ZK−1 (i.e., common
randomness). To this end, by Slepian Wolf coding [7] (random binning), the transmitter needs
to broadcast maxq∈[1:K−1]H(z1, · · · , zK−1|zq, zK)L + o(L) bits over L key blocks and note that
these bits are available to the eavesdropping Receiver K as well. After this communication for
omniscience step, the qualified receivers all know Z1, · · · , ZK−1 so that from privacy amplification
(under eavesdropped public communication), they can agree on a key of size (H(z1, · · · , zK−1|zK)−
maxq∈[1:K−1]H(z1, · · · , zK−1|zq, zK))L+o(L) = minq∈[1:K−1]H(zq|zK)L+o(L) bits that are almost
unknown to the eavesdropping Receiver K (i.e., the conditional entropy subtracts the amount of
leaked communication). Equipped with these secure key bits, the desired rate can be easily achieved
with one-time pad coding.
Remark 3 Similar to combinatorial secure multicast (see Remark 1), the minimum broadcast band-
width of secure multicast under the discrete memoryless key setting is an open problem. In par-
ticular, the step of communication for omniscience is not necessary and might cause additional
broadcast bandwidth (this statement is also true for the key agreement problem [6]).
5 Related Work
The elemental problem of secure groupcast has interesting connections to several problems that
have been studied in prior work and this section is devoted to the discussion of these connections.
Due to space limits, we will focus on the connections to secure groupcast and leave further details
to the references cited.
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Secret Key Agreement (Generation)
In the problem of key agreement [6, 8–11], multiple terminals observing correlated sources wish to
agree on a common key through public communication and it is required that an eavesdropper
learns nothing about the key from public communication.
Secret key agreement provides a natural achievable scheme for secure groupcast, where the
legitimate receivers first agree on a secret key that is not known to the eavesdropping receivers
(with the help of the transmitter and the noiseless broadcast channel). Then the secret key can be
used to encrypt the desired message. This idea has been used in Section 4.2. Unfortunately, secret
key agreement is only understood when there is a single eavesdropper [6] but in secure groupcast,
we have multiple eavesdroppers, each with a different view of the source. Also, for key agreement,
only the maximum key rate (corresponding to the groupcast rate in secure groupcast) is known and
the communication cost (corresponding to the broadcast bandwidth in secure groupcast) remains
open in general [6]. Lastly, key agreement does not appear necessary for secure groupcast.
Latent Capacity Region
The latent capacity region of broadcast channels [12–14] studies the implication of a rate tuple of
common messages for various subsets of receivers being achievable, i.e., how can the achievable rates
of certain group of receivers be exchanged for those of other groups of receivers? This interesting
open problem is conceptually related to combinatorial secure groupcast, where from a rate exchange
perspective, we are asking how to exchange various key variables shared by subsets of receivers to a
common message for the group of desired receivers. However, latent capacity region has no security
constraint and the required techniques in achievability and converse appear different.
Secure Broadcasting
How to send messages securely over a broadcast channel has been studied along the line of Wyner’s
wiretap channel [15], and its generalizations to confidential messages (see e.g., [16,17]), and secure
broadcasting over wireless channels (see e.g., [18, 19]). The enabler of secure communication in
this line of work is that different receivers experience different channels, i.e., the channel itself has
relative advantage to be exploited. In contrast, in secure groupcast every receiver sees the same
noiseless broadcast channel and relative advantage comes from the shared keys. Notably, a recent
work has studied a model (with a few users and a simple key structure) where both shared keys
and discrete memoryless broadcast channels are simultaneously present [20].
Secure (Private) Index Coding
Index coding [21] is a canonical problem that studies how to efficiently broadcast under various
side information at the receiver side with a noiseless broadcast channel. There are several variants
of index coding that include security constraints (see e.g., [22–24]) with and without shared keys
and with and without external eavesdroppers. The main focus of index coding works is on the side
information structure and its interplay with multiple desired messages. Secure groupcast highlights
the shared key structure and its influence on message rate and broadcast bandwidth.
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6 Proofs
6.1 Proof of Theorem 1: Converse on R
Consider any qualified Receiver q ∈ [1 : N ] and any eavesdropping Receiver e ∈ [N + 1 : K].
RL
(4)
= H(W ) (61)
(1)
= H(W |Ze) (62)
(2)
= I(W ;X,Zq|Ze) + o(L) (63)
(3)
= I(W ;Zq|X,Ze) + o(L) (64)
≤ H(Zq|Ze) + o(L) (65)
= LH(zq|ze) + o(L). (66)
Normalizing (66) by L and letting L→∞, we have the desired converse bound R ≤ H(zq|ze).
6.2 Proof of Theorem 2: Converse on β(R)
To simplify the notations, we set Q = {1, 2, · · · , Q} ⊂ [1 : N ], which has no loss of generality. Let
us start with a useful lemma.
Lemma 2 For any q ∈ [1 : Q− 1], we have
I(X;Zq+1|Z1, · · · , Zq, Ue,W ) ≥ H(W )− I(Z1, · · · , Zq;Zq+1|Ue) + o(L). (67)
Proof:
I(X;Zq+1|Z1, · · · , Zq, Ue,W )
(1)
= I(X,W ;Zq+1|Z1, · · · , Zq, Ue) (68)
= I(X,W,Z1, · · · , Zq;Zq+1|Ue)− I(Z1, · · · , Zq;Zq+1|Ue) (69)
≥ I(W ;Zq+1|Ue, X)− I(Z1, · · · , Zq;Zq+1|Ue) (70)
(2)
= H(W |Ue, X)− I(Z1, · · · , Zq;Zq+1|Ue) + o(L) (71)
(3)
= H(W |Ue)− I(Z1, · · · , Zq;Zq+1|Ue) + o(L) (72)
(1)
= H(W )− I(Z1, · · · , Zq;Zq+1|Ue) + o(L). (73)
Next, we apply Lemma 2 to decompose the term I(X;W,Z1, · · · , ZQ|Ue).
I(X;W,Z1, · · · , ZQ|Ue)
= I(X;W,Z1|Ue) +
Q−1∑
q=1
I(X;Zq+1|Z1, · · · , Zq, Ue,W ) (74)
(67)
≥ I(X;W |Z1, Ue) +
Q−1∑
q=1
(
H(W )− I(Z1, · · · , Zq;Zq+1|Ue) + o(L)
)
(75)
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(1)
= I(X,Z1, Ue;W ) +
Q−1∑
q=1
(
H(W )− I(Z1, · · · , Zq;Zq+1|Ue) + o(L)
)
(76)
(2)
= H(W ) + o(L) +
Q−1∑
q=1
(
H(W )− I(Z1, · · · , Zq;Zq+1|Ue) + o(L)
)
(77)
= QH(W )−
Q−1∑
q=1
I(Z1, · · · , Zq;Zq+1|Ue) + o(L). (78)
Finally, note that
β(R)L
(5)
= LX log2 p (79)
≥ H(X) (80)
≥ H(X|Ue) (81)
≥ I(X;W,Z1, · · · , ZQ|Ue). (82)
Combining (78), (82), we have
β(R)L ≥ QH(W )−
Q−1∑
q=1
I(Z1, · · · , Zq;Zq+1|Ue) + o(L). (83)
Normalizing (83) by L and letting L→∞, we have the desired converse bound on β(R).
6.3 Proof of Theorem 3: Secure Unicast
The converse bounds for the capacity and the broadcast bandwidth follow immediately from The-
orem 1 and Theorem 2, respectively. The achievable scheme is presented as follows.
We show that rate R = mine∈[2:K]
∑
U⊂[1:K]:1∈U ,e/∈U H(sU ) and broadcast bandwidth β(R) = R
are achievable. Set LW = R/ log2 p and L = 1. Set the field size p to be the least prime power such
that p ≥ LW +
∑
U⊂[1:K]:1∈U LU .
X = W +
∑
U⊂[1:K]:1∈U
VUsU = W +
[
V1 V12 · · · V1:K
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,V

s1
s12
...
s1:K
 (84)
where X,W ∈ FLW×1p , VU ∈ FLW×LUp , sU ∈ FLU×1p and V is chosen as a full-rank Cauchy matrix
of dimension LW ×
∑
U⊂[1:K]:1∈U LU such that the element in i-th row and j-th column is given by
V(i, j) =
1
ai − bj , ai, bj are distinct elements over Fp. (85)
The correctness constraint (2) is trivially satisfied. We verify the security constraint (3). Con-
sider any eavesdropping Receiver e ∈ [2 : K].
I(W ;X,Ze)
(1)(84)
= I(W ;W +
∑
U⊂[1:K]:1∈U
VUsU |ze) (86)
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= I
(
W ;W +
∑
U⊂[1:K]:1∈U ,e/∈U
VUsU |(sU : e ∈ U)
)
(87)
(1)(6)
= I
(
W ;W +
∑
U⊂[1:K]:1∈U ,e/∈U
VUsU
)
(88)
(1)
= H
(
W +
∑
U⊂[1:K]:1∈U ,e/∈U
VUsU
)
−H
( ∑
U⊂[1:K]:1∈U ,e/∈U
VUsU
)
(89)
≤ LW log2 p− LW log2 p = 0 (90)
where in the last step, the first term of LW log2 p follows from the fact that the vector has LW
symbols from Fp and the second term of −LW log2 p follows from the fact that the sub-matrix
[VU : U ⊂ [1 : K], 1 ∈ U , e /∈ U ] of the Cauchy matrix V has rank LW (as it has at least LW
columns and exactly LW rows) and sU are i.i.d. uniform symbols.
Finally, the rate and broadcast bandwidth achieved match the converse such that the proof of
Theorem 3 is complete.
6.4 Proof of Theorem 4: Secure Multicast
We first consider the capacity of combinatorial secure multicast. The converse follows directly from
Theorem 1 and we consider the achievability.
We show that rate R = minq∈[1:K−1]
∑
U⊂[1:K−1]:q∈U H(sU ) is achievable. Set LW = R/ log2 p
and L = 1. Set the field size p to be the least prime power such that p ≥ LW +
∑
U⊂[1:K−1] LU .
The transmit signal has 2K−1 − 1 row blocks, each corresponding to a subset of [1 : K − 1].
X = [X1;X2; · · · ;XU ; · · · ;X1:K−1]
XU = VUW + sU ,∀U ⊂ [1 : K − 1] (91)
where XU ∈ FLU×1p ,VU ∈ FLU×LWp ,W ∈ FLW×1p , sU ∈ FLU×1p and the precoding matrices VU are
sub-matrices of a Cauchy matrix, set as follows.
V = [V1;V2; · · · ;VU ; · · · ;V1:K−1]∑U⊂[1:K−1] LU×LW , (92)
V(i, j) =
1
ai − bj , ai, bj are distinct elements over Fp. (93)
Security is guaranteed because the keys known to the eavesdropping Receiver K do not appear
in the transmit signal and the sU variables are independent. Correctness constraint is satisfied
because each qualified Receiver q ∈ [1 : K − 1] can recover at least LW linear combinations of the
message symbols W , i.e., (VUW : q ∈ U ⊂ [1 : K − 1]), from which W can be decoded as any
sub-matrix of a full-rank Cauchy matrix has full rank.
Next we proceed to the minimum broadcast bandwidth of combinatorial secure multicast. The
broadcast bandwidth achieved by the scheme above is β(C) =
∑
U⊂[1:K−1]H(sU ), which is optimal
when H(z1|zK) = · · · = H(zK−1|zK). This follows from Theorem 2, where we set Q = [1 : K − 1]
and ue = zK .
β(C) ≥ (K − 1)C − (
K−1∑
q=1
H(zq|zK)−H(z1, · · · , zK−1|zK)) (94)
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= H(z1, · · · , zK−1|zK) =
∑
U⊂[1:K−1]
H(sU ) (95)
where (95) follows from the fact that C = H(z1|zK) = · · · = H(zK−1|zK). The proof when K = 4
is more involved as we need to improve the above achievable scheme, and is presented next.
6.4.1 β∗(C) when K = 4
First, we consider the converse. Note that in this case, C = H(z1|z4). From (25), we need two
converse bounds. The first one is obtained by setting Q = {1, 2}, ue = z4 in Theorem 2,
β(C) ≥ 2C − I(z1; z2|z4) = 2H(z1|z4)− I(z1; z2|z4) (96)
= 2H(s1) + 2H(s12) + 2H(s13) + 2H(s123)− (H(s12) +H(s123)) (97)
= 2H(s1) +H(s12) + 2H(s13) +H(s123). (98)
The second one is obtained by setting Q = {1, 2, 3}, ue = z4 in Theorem 2,
β(C) ≥ 3C − (I(z1; z2|z4) + I(z1, z2; z3|z4)) (99)
= 3H(s1) + 3H(s12) + 3H(s13) + 3H(s123)− (H(s12) +H(s13) +H(s23) + 2H(s123))
= 3H(s1) + 2H(s12) + 2H(s13)−H(s23) +H(s123). (100)
Second, we consider the achievability, where we need to adjust the size of the keys used in (91)
depending on the key configuration. We present the scheme that achieves rate R = H(z1|z4) =
H(s1) +H(s12) +H(s13) +H(s123). Set LW = R/ log2 p and L = 1.
We have 3 cases depending on the relationship between H(s23), H(s1)+H(s13), H(s1)+H(s12).
For each case, set the field size p to be the least prime power such that p ≥ LX +LW . The transmit
signal has 7 row blocks and the 4 blocks X1, X12, X13, X123 (corresponding to the keys known to
Receiver 1) are the same for all 3 cases, where all key symbols are used.
X = [X1;X2;X3;X12;X13;X23;X123]
X1 = V1W + s1, X12 = V12W + s12, X13 = V13W + s13, X123 = V123W + s123 (101)
where the sizes of the matrices and vectors above are the same as before (see (91)). Note that now
Receiver 1 can achieve rate R and in the remaining proof, we only need to consider Receiver 2 and
Receiver 3. The remaining blocks X2, X3, X23 are designed for each case separately, where not all
the key symbols may be used. Note that H(s12) ≤ H(s13), i.e., L12 ≤ L13.
Case 1. H(s23) ≥ H(s1) +H(s13).
X2 = (), X3 = (), X23 = V
[1]
23W + s
[1]
23 (102)
where s
[1]
23 ∈ F(L1+L13)×1p is comprised of the first L1 +L13 symbols from s23 (which has more
symbols, i.e., L23 ≥ L1 +L13) and V[1]23 ∈ F(L1+L13)×LWp . We verify that the number of linear
combinations of the message decodable by Receiver 2 and Receiver 3 is no less than LW .
For Receiver 2: |X12|+ |X23|+ |X123| = L12 + (L1 + L13) + L123 = LW , (103)
For Receiver 3: |X13|+ |X23|+ |X123| = L13 + (L1 + L13) + L123 ≥ LW . (104)
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The transmit signal size is
LX = |X1|+ |X12|+ |X13|+ |X123|+ |X23| = L1 + L12 + L13 + L123 + (L1 + L13) (105)
which matches the converse bound (98) for broadcast bandwidth. The other cases are similar.
Case 2. H(s1) +H(s12) ≤ H(s23) ≤ H(s1) +H(s13).
X2 = V
[2]
2 W + s
[2]
2 , X3 = (), X23 = V23W + s23 (106)
where s
[2]
2 ∈ F(L1+L13−L23)×1p is comprised of the first L1 + L13 − L23 symbols from s2 (which
has more symbols, i.e., L2 ≥ L1 + L13 − L23 because H(z1|z4) ≤ H(z2|z4)) and V[2]2 ∈
F(L1+L13−L23)×LWp . We verify that the number of linear combinations of the message decodable
by Receiver 2 and Receiver 3 is no less than LW .
For Receiver 2: |X2|+ |X12|+ |X23|+ |X123| = (L1 + L13 − L23) + L12 + L23 + L123
= L1 + L12 + L13 + L123 = LW , (107)
For Receiver 3: |X13|+ |X23|+ |X123| = L13 + L23 + L123 ≥ LW . (108)
The transmit signal size is
LX = |X1|+ |X12|+ |X13|+ |X123|+ |X2|+ |X23| (109)
= L1 + L12 + L13 + L123 + (L1 + L13 − L23) + L23 (110)
which matches the converse bound (98) for broadcast bandwidth.
Case 3. H(s23) ≤ H(s1) +H(s12).
X2 = V
[3]
2 W + s
[3]
2 , X3 = V
[3]
3 W + s
[3]
3 , X23 = V23W + s23 (111)
s
[3]
2 ∈ F(L1+L13−L23)×1p ,V[3]2 ∈ F(L1+L13−L23)×LWp (112)
s
[3]
3 ∈ F(L1+L12−L23)×1p ,V[3]3 ∈ F(L1+L12−L23)×LWp (113)
where L2 ≥ L1+L13−L23 and L3 ≥ L1+L12−L23 becauseH(z1|z4) ≤ min(H(z2|z4), H(z3|z4)).
We verify that the number of linear combinations of the message decodable by Receiver 2
and Receiver 3 is no less than LW .
For Receiver 2: |X2|+ |X12|+ |X23|+ |X123| = (L1 + L13 − L23) + L12 + L23 + L123
= L1 + L12 + L13 + L123 = LW , (114)
For Receiver 3: |X3|+ |X13|+ |X23|+ |X123| = (L1 + L12 − L23) + L13 + L23 + L123
= L1 + L12 + L13 + L123 = LW . (115)
The transmit signal size is
LX = |X1|+ |X12|+ |X13|+ |X123|+ |X2|+ |X3|+ |X23| (116)
= L1 + L12 + L13 + L123 + (L1 + L13 − L23) + (L1 + L12 − L23) + L23 (117)
which matches the converse bound (100) for broadcast bandwidth.
After the sizes are specified, the remaining proof is the same as that presented above, where we
set V as a full-rank Cauchy matrix and the correctness and security constraints are satisfied. The
proof of β∗(C) when K = 4 is thus complete.
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6.5 Proof of Theorem 5: The N = 2, K = 4 Case
The converse of rate and broadcast bandwidth follows from Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, and we
present the achievable scheme now. Set p = 2 (i.e., binary field) and L = 1 (i.e., one key block).
The idea is to decompose every instance into multiple component sub-networks, where the basic
components are listed in the following figure.
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Figure 6: The 6 basic components with (correct and secure) achievable schemes.
Next, we divide the problem instance into multiple cases, where each case requires a different
decomposition. As s12 is only known to qualified Receiver 1 and Receiver 2, we can easily use
s12 to achieve rate H(s12) with broadcast bandwidth H(s12), by one-time pad. Without loss
of generality, we assume H(s1) ≤ H(s2), H(s124) ≤ H(s123). As such, for all cases we invoke
Component 1 H(s124) times (i.e., use H(s124) bits of s123, s124) and Component 2 H(s1) times (use
H(s1) bits of s1, s2). We write this succinctly as
H(s124)× Cmp 1 +H(s1)× Cmp 2. (118)
We proceed next depending on the key configurations. Specifically, all cases are divided as follows.
Case 1. H(s2)−H(s1) ≥ min(H(s13), H(s14)). We further invoke
min(H(s13), H(s14))× Cmp 3 (119)
where we can employ the scheme in Component 3 a number of min(H(s13), H(s14)) times
because we have H(s2)−H(s1) bits left of s2 and H(s2)−H(s1) ≥ min(H(s13), H(s14)). The
remaining steps need further division.
Case 1.1. H(s14) ≤ H(s13). No further action is needed. Tracing back, we have invoked
one-time pad of s12, (118), and (119). Therefore we have achieved
R = H(s12) +H(s124) +H(s1) +H(s14), β(R) = H(s12) +H(s124) + 2H(s1) + 2H(s14)
which match the converse (33) and (34). Note that the converse bounds are minimum or
maximum of several terms and it suffices to show the achievability of one term.
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Case 1.2. H(s14) ≥ H(s13). We need to further consider the following cases.
Case 1.2.1. min(H(s14) −H(s13), H(s123) −H(s124), H(s24)) = H(s14) −H(s13). We
further invoke
(H(s14)−H(s13))× Cmp 4 (120)
and the description of the scheme is complete for this case. We trace back and find that
R = H(s12) +H(s124) +H(s1) +H(s14), β(R) = H(s12) +H(s124) + 2H(s1) + 2H(s14)
are achieved and they are optimal as the formulas match the converse.
Case 1.2.2. min(H(s14)−H(s13), H(s123)−H(s124), H(s24)) = H(s123)−H(s124). We
further invoke
(H(s123)−H(s124))× Cmp 4 (121)
and the description of the scheme is complete for this case. We trace back and find that
R = H(s12) +H(s1) +H(s13) +H(s123), (122)
β(R) = H(s12)−H(s124) + 2H(s1) + 2H(s13) + 2H(s123) (123)
are achieved and they are optimal as the formulas match the converse.
Case 1.2.3. min(H(s14) − H(s13), H(s123) − H(s124), H(s24)) = H(s24). We further
invoke
H(s24)× Cmp 4 (124)
and need to consider the following cases.
Case 1.2.3.1. min(H(s2) − H(s1) − H(s13), H(s14) − H(s13) − H(s24), H(s123) −
H(s124)−H(s24)) = H(s2)−H(s1)−H(s13). We further invoke(
H(s2)−H(s1)−H(s13)
)× Cmp 5 such that overall (125)
R = H(s12) +H(s124) +H(s24) +H(s2), (126)
β(R) = H(s12) +H(s124) + 2H(s24) + 2H(s2). (127)
Case 1.2.3.2. min(H(s2) − H(s1) − H(s13), H(s14) − H(s13) − H(s24), H(s123) −
H(s124)−H(s24)) = H(s14)−H(s13)−H(s24). We further invoke(
H(s14)−H(s13)−H(s24)
)× Cmp 5 such that overall (128)
R = H(s12) +H(s124) +H(s1) +H(s14), (129)
β(R) = H(s12) +H(s124) + 2H(s1) + 2H(s14). (130)
Case 1.2.3.3. min(H(s2) − H(s1) − H(s13), H(s14) − H(s13) − H(s24), H(s123) −
H(s124)−H(s24)) = H(s123)−H(s124)−H(s24). We further invoke(
H(s123)−H(s124)−H(s24)
)× Cmp 5 such that overall (131)
R = H(s12) +H(s1) +H(s13) +H(s123), (132)
β(R) = H(s12)−H(s124) + 2H(s1) + 2H(s13) + 2H(s123). (133)
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Case 2. H(s2)−H(s1) ≤ min(H(s13), H(s14)). We further invoke(
H(s2)−H(s1)
)× Cmp 3 (134)
and consider the following cases.
Case 2.1. min(H(s24), H(s14)−H(s2) +H(s1), H(s123)−H(s124)) = H(s24). We further
invoke
H(s24)× Cmp 4 (135)
and the description of the scheme is complete for this case. We trace back and find that
R = H(s12) +H(s124) +H(s2) +H(s24), (136)
β(R) = H(s12) +H(s124) + 2H(s2) + 2H(s24) (137)
are achieved and they are optimal as the formulas match the converse.
Case 2.2. min(H(s24), H(s14)−H(s2) +H(s1), H(s123)−H(s124)) = H(s14)−H(s2) +
H(s1). We further invoke(
H(s14)−H(s2) +H(s1)
)× Cmp 4 (138)
and the description of the scheme is complete for this case. We trace back and find that
R = H(s12) +H(s124) +H(s14) +H(s1), (139)
β(R) = H(s12) +H(s124) + 2H(s14) + 2H(s1) (140)
are achieved and they are optimal as the formulas match the converse.
Case 2.3. min(H(s24), H(s14)−H(s2) +H(s1), H(s123)−H(s124)) = H(s123)−H(s124).
We further invoke (
H(s123)−H(s124)
)× Cmp 4 (141)
and need to consider the following cases.
Case 2.3.1. min(H(s14)−H(s2)+H(s1)−H(s123)+H(s124), H(s13)−H(s2)+H(s1), H(s24)−
H(s123)+H(s124), H(s23)) = H(s14)−H(s2)+H(s1)−H(s123)+H(s124). We further invoke(
H(s14)−H(s2) +H(s1)−H(s123) +H(s124)
)× Cmp 6 such that overall (142)
R = H(s12) +H(s124) +H(s14) +H(s1), (143)
β(R) = H(s12) +H(s124) + 2H(s14) + 2H(s1). (144)
Case 2.3.2. min(H(s14)−H(s2)+H(s1)−H(s123)+H(s124), H(s13)−H(s2)+H(s1), H(s24)−
H(s123) +H(s124), H(s23)) = H(s13)−H(s2) +H(s1). We further invoke(
H(s13)−H(s2) +H(s1)
)× Cmp 6 such that overall (145)
R = H(s12) +H(s123) +H(s13) +H(s1), (146)
β(R) = H(s12)−H(s124) + 2H(s123) + 2H(s13) + 2H(s1). (147)
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Case 2.3.3. min(H(s14)−H(s2)+H(s1)−H(s123)+H(s124), H(s13)−H(s2)+H(s1), H(s24)−
H(s123) +H(s124), H(s23)) = H(s24)−H(s123) +H(s124). We further invoke(
H(s24)−H(s123) +H(s124)
)× Cmp 6 such that overall (148)
R = H(s12) +H(s124) +H(s2) +H(s24) (149)
β(R) = H(s12) +H(s124) + 2H(s2) + 2H(s24) (150)
Case 2.3.4. min(H(s14)−H(s2)+H(s1)−H(s123)+H(s124), H(s13)−H(s2)+H(s1), H(s24)−
H(s123) +H(s124), H(s23)) = H(s23). We further invoke
H(s23)× Cmp 6 such that overall (151)
R = H(s12) +H(s2) +H(s123) +H(s23), (152)
β(R) = H(s12)−H(s124) + 2H(s2) + 2H(s123) + 2H(s23). (153)
6.6 Proof of Theorem 6: The Symmetric Setting
The rate converse follows from Theorem 1, where among u-keys, any qualified Receiver q ∈ [1 : N ]
knows
(
K−2
u−1
)
keys that are not known to any eavesdropping Receiver e ∈ [N + 1 : K] because we
may pick any u − 1 receivers from any K − 2 receivers other than Receiver q and Receiver e to
form a u-key (note that Receiver q must be included). The broadcast bandwidth converse follows
from Theorem 2, where we set Q = [1 : N ], ue = zK and obtain β(C) ≥ H(z1, · · · , zN |zK). Among
u-keys, we have
(
K−1
u
)− (K−N−1u ) keys in the term H(z1, · · · , zN |zK) because we pick u-keys from
receivers 1 to K − 1 and need to remove the ones that are only known to receivers N + 1 to K − 1.
To sum up for the converse part, we have proved that
C ≤
K∑
u=1
(
K − 2
u− 1
)
L[u] log2 p, β
∗(C) ≥
K∑
u=1
((
K − 1
u
)
−
(
K −N − 1
u
))
L[u] log2 p. (154)
We next show that the above rate and broadcast bandwidth are achievable. Similar to Example
4, we consider u-keys separately for different u values and then combine the decomposed schemes
using Lemma 1. Consider a fixed value of u ∈ [1 : K] and further consider the u-keys that are
known to i qualified receivers and u− i eavesdropping receivers, where i ∈ [1 : u].
We focus on one specific set of i qualified receivers, say receivers from the set I where I ⊂
[1 : N ], |I| = i. That is, we consider the keys (sU : [1 : N ] ∩ U = I, |U| = u) and there are(
K−N
u−i
)
such u-keys. Further these
(
K−N
u−i
)
keys are known to all qualified receivers from I, and
each eavesdropping receiver knows
(
K−N−1
u−i−1
)
keys from these keys. Invoking generic linear codes
similar to Example 4, we can securely send (
(
K−N
u−i
)−(K−N−1u−i−1 ))L[u] = (K−N−1u−i )L[u] generic message
symbols to receivers from I by transmitting (K−N−1u−i )L[u] symbols.
X [u],I = VwIW
[u] +
∑
U :[1:N ]∩U=I,|U|=u
VsUsU (155)
where VwI is a
(
K−N−1
u−i
)
L[u] × (N−1i−1 )(K−N−1u−i )L[u] matrix over Fp and VsU is a (K−N−1u−i )L[u] × L[u]
matrix over Fp. Repeat the same coding procedure for all sets I such that I ⊂ [1 : N ] and |I| = i.
Consider the row stack of all the VwI matrices appeared (denoted as V
[u],w) and the column stack
of all the VsU matrices appeared (denoted as V
[u],s). Set V[u],w and V[u],s as two Cauchy matrices
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from a sufficiently large field. The exact field size required and detailed analysis of security and
correctness are similar to those in Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 and thus are not repeated here.
Note that when we consider all sets of i qualified receivers, overall there are
(
N
i
)
choices and any
particular qualified receiver is picked
(
N−1
i−1
)
times, so the size of W [u] is set as
(
N−1
i−1
)(
K−N−1
u−i
)
L[u].
Security and correctness hold by the generic property of Cauchy matrices over large fields.
Counting all sets of i qualified receivers and all u-keys, where i ∈ [1 : u], u ∈ [1 : K], we calculate
the overall performance as follows.
R =
K∑
u=1
u∑
i=1
H(W [u]) =
K∑
u=1
u∑
i=1
(
N − 1
i− 1
)(
K −N − 1
u− i
)
L[u] log2 p (156)
=
K∑
u=1
u−1∑
j=0
(
N − 1
j
)(
K −N − 1
u− 1− j
)
L[u] log2 p =
K∑
u=1
(
K − 2
u− 1
)
L[u] log2 p (157)
and
β(R) =
K∑
u=1
u∑
i=1
(
N
i
)(
K −N − 1
u− i
)
L[u] log2 p (158)
=
K∑
u=1
(
u∑
i=0
(
N
i
)(
K −N − 1
u− i
)
−
(
N
0
)(
K −N − 1
u
))
L[u] log2 p (159)
=
K∑
u=1
((
K − 1
u
)
−
(
K −N − 1
u
))
L[u] log2 p (160)
where both rate and broadcast bandwidth match the converse bounds. Note that we have used
decompositions of schemes with independent u-keys (refer to Lemma 1) and for each u, we invoke the
generic coding scheme (155) where a specific finite field Fp is used. To ensure the overall scheme
operates over the same field, we will use the maximum field size p required for all component
schemes and the Cauchy matrix based scheme in (155) works for any field size that is larger than
the minimum required. The proof of Theorem 6 is thus complete.
6.7 Proof of Theorem 7: Rate Converse for The N = 2, K = 5 Instance
The rate converse is split into two lemmas. Before presenting the lemmas, we first summarize the
entropy identities from the problem description.
(Combinatorial Keys) H(a, b, c, d, e) = H(a) +H(b) +H(c) +H(d) +H(e) (161)
(Same Key Sizes) H(a) = H(b) = H(c) = H(d) = H(e) = L (162)
(Correctness) H(W |X, a, b, c) = H(W |X, b, d, e) = o(L) (163)
(Security) I(W ;X, b) = I(W ;X, c, d) = I(W ;X, c, e) = o(L). (164)
Lemma 3 For the secure groupcast instance in Fig. 4, we have
H(d, e|W,X, b) ≤ 2L−H(W ) + o(L). (165)
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Proof:
H(d, e|W,X, b) = H(d, e|X, b)− I(d, e;W |X, b) (166)
(162)
≤ 2L−H(W |X, b) +H(W |X, b, d, e) (167)
(164)(163)
= 2L−H(W ) + o(L). (168)
Lemma 4 For the secure groupcast instance in Fig. 4, we have
H(d, e|W,X, b) ≥ 2H(W )− 3L+ o(L). (169)
Proof: Consider eavesdropping Receiver 4 such that X, c, d shall not reveal anything about W .
H(W,X, c, d)
(164)
= H(W ) +H(X, c, d) + o(L) (170)
≥ H(W ) +H(X, b, c, d)−H(b) + o(L). (171)
Symmetrically, consider eavesdropping Receiver 5 such that X, c, e shall not reveal anything
about W .
H(W,X, c, e)
(164)
= H(W ) +H(X, c, e) + o(L) (172)
≥ H(W ) +H(X, b, c, e)−H(b) + o(L). (173)
Adding (171) and (173) and applying sub-modularity, we have
H(W,X, c, d) +H(W,X, c, e)
≥ 2H(W )− 2H(b) +H(X, b, c, d, e) +H(X, b, c) + o(L) (174)
(163)
≥ 2H(W )− 2H(b) +H(W,X, b, c, d, e) +H(X, a, b, c)−H(a) + o(L) (175)
(163)
≥ 2H(W )− 2H(b) +H(W,X, c, d) +H(W,X, a, b, c)−H(a) + o(L). (176)
Rearranging terms above and applying (162), we have
2H(W )− 3L+ o(L) ≤ H(W,X, c, e)−H(W,X, a, b, c) (177)
≤ H(W,X, a, b, c, d, e)−H(W,X, a, b, c) (178)
= H(d, e|W,X, a, b, c) (179)
≤ H(d, e|W,X, b). (180)
Finally, combining Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, we have
2H(W )− 3L+ o(L) ≤ 2L−H(W ) + o(L) (181)
⇒ R = H(W )
L
≤ 5
3
+
o(L)
L
(182)
and letting L→∞ produces the desired bound R ≤ 5/3.
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6.8 Proof of Theorem 8: Multiple Messages
Let us start with the converse proof, which is a generalization of that in Theorem 1 and Theorem
2. Consider (54) and (55) follows from symmetry.
(R1 +R12)L = H(W1) +H(W12) (183)
(50)
= I(W1,W12;X,S1, S12) + o(L) (184)
(52)
= I(W1,W12;S1, S12|X) + o(L) (185)
≤ H(S1, S12) + o(L) = (H(s1) +H(s12))L+ o(L). (186)
Consider (56) and (57) follows from symmetry.
R1L = H(W1)
(50)
= I(W1;X,S1, S12) + o(L) (187)
(51)
= I(W1;S1|X,S12) + o(L) (188)
≤ H(S1) + o(L) = H(s1)L+ o(L). (189)
Consider (58).
β(R1, R2, R12)L ≥ H(X) ≥ H(X|S1, S2, S12) (190)
≥ I(X;W1,W2,W12|S1, S2, S12) (191)
(50)(51)
= H(W1,W2,W12|S1, S2, S12) + o(L) (192)
(49)
= H(W1) +H(W2) +H(W12) + o(L) (193)
= (R1 +R2 +R12)L+ o(L), (194)
β(R1, R2, R12) ≥ I(X;W1,W2,W12, Z1, Z2) (195)
= I(X;W1,W12, Z1) + I(X;W2, Z2|W1,W2,W12, Z1) (196)
≥ I(X;W1,W12|Z1) + I(X;Z2|W1,W2,W12, Z1) (197)
(49)
= I(X,Z1;W1,W12) + I(X,W2,W12;Z2|W1, Z1) (198)
(50)
= H(W1,W12) + I(X,W2,W12, Z1;Z2|W1)
−I(Z1;Z2|W1) + o(L) (199)
(49)
≥ H(W1,W12) + I(W2,W12;Z2|X,W1)− I(Z1;Z2) + o(L) (200)
(51)
= H(W1,W12) +H(W2,W12|X,W1)− I(Z1;Z2) + o(L) (201)
(52)
= H(W1,W12) +H(W2,W12|W1)− I(Z1;Z2) + o(L) (202)
(49)
= (R1 +R12 +R2 +R12 −H(s12))L+ o(L). (203)
Next, we consider the achievability. Consider any rational rate tuple (R1, R2, R12) ∈ C, i.e.,
(R1, R2, R12) satisfies (54) - (57). Without loss of generality, assume R1, R2, R12 are integers (for
rationals, we may consider blocks over the least common multiple of the denominators so that the
number of bits becomes integers). We operate over the binary field and consider L = 1 block. The
transmit signal is designed as follows. Denote by W [a1:a2] the a1-th to a2-th bits in the vector W .
We have two cases.
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Case 1. R12 ≤ H(s12).
X = (W1 + s
[1:R1]
1 ; W2 + s
[1:R2]
2 ; W12 + s
[1:R12]
12 ). (204)
The broadcast bandwidth achieved is β(R1, R2, R12) = R1 +R2 +R12.
Case 2. R12 > H(s12).
X =
 W1 + s
[1:R1]
1 ; W2 + s
[1:R2]
2 ; W
[1:H(s12)]
12 + s12
W
[H(s12)+1:R12]
12 + s
[R1+1:R1+R12−H(s12)]
1
W
[H(s12)+1:R12]
12 + s
[R2+1:R2+R12−H(s12)]
2
 . (205)
Note that as (R1, R2, R12) satisfies (54) − (57), the key bits in the above scheme exist. The
broadcast bandwidth achieved is β(R1, R2, R12) = R1 +R2 + 2R12 −H(s12).
Thus any rational rate tuple in the capacity region is achievable and as rational tuples are dense
over the reals, the proof of Theorem 8 is complete.
6.9 Proof of Theorem 9: Achievability under Discrete Memoryless Keys
Before presenting the achievability proof for Theorem 9, we cite a lemma on privacy amplification5,
which encapsulates most technicalities of the achievability proof.
Lemma 5 (Lemma 5.18 in [27]) Consider random variables Zc, Ze, Xe (with finite cardinality) such
that Zc, Ze are L length extensions of zc, ze and LXe denotes the number of bits in Xe. Then there
exists a random mapping (independent of Ze, Xe) from Zc to a uniform random variable Z with
LZ bits such that
LZ = H(zc|ze)L− LXe + o(L), (206)
I(Z;Ze, Xe) = o(L). (207)
In Lemma 5, we may interpret Z as the secret key to be generated from a known variable Zc such
that Z is almost independent of an eavesdropped variable Ze (that has certain joint distribution
with Zc) and a prior knowledge variable Xe (that is arbitrarily correlated with Zc, Ze). The secret
key size turns out to be given by the conditional entropy value minus the leaked prior knowledge.
Consider secure unicast first, whose achievability proof follows immediately from Lemma 5.
Set Zc = Z1, i.e., the key for qualified Receiver 1, Ze as the key for eavesdropping Receiver
e ∈ [2 : K], and Xe = (). From Lemma 5, we know that Receiver 1 can generate a key Z that
is almost independent from any eavesdropping receiver. Note that the random mapping used in
Lemma 5 does not depend on the eavesdropped variable Ze so that the secret key Z generated is
simultaneously independent of any eavesdropped variable as long as we pick the key length to be
LZ = mine∈[2:K]H(z1|ze)L + o(L). We use the key to send the desired message through one-time
pad, i.e., X = W + Z where the length of W is the same as the length of Z. Correctness and
security are easy to verify (as Z is almost independent of Ze, see (207)). The rate and broadcast
bandwidth achieved are R = β(R) = mine∈[2:K]H(z1|ze) as L→∞.
5Lemma 5 on secret key extraction suffices for our purposes over long key block lengths. Stronger non-asymptotic
results and more efficient constructions of the random mappings are available in the literature (see e.g., [25, 26]).
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Then consider secure multicast. In Lemma 5, we set Zc = (Z1, Z2, · · · , ZK−1), Ze = ZK , and Xe
as the random bin index of (Z1, Z2, · · · , ZK−1) of length maxq∈[1:K−1]H(z1, · · · , zK−1|zq, zK)L +
o(L). The key Z is generated from Zc and has length as specified in Lemma 5. The transmit
signal sent by the transmitter is X = (ZK , Xe,W + Z). From ZK , Xe, every qualified Receiver
q, q ∈ [1 : K−1] can recover Zc (by Slepian Wolf coding as the overall information seen by Receiver
q, i.e., ZK , Xe, Zq has entropy whose value is at least the joint entropy, H(Z1, · · · , ZK)) and then
generate Z with the same random mapping used by the transmitter. After extracting the common
key Z, W can be decoded with vanishing error by every qualified receiver. Security is guaranteed by
Lemma 5 as Z is almost independent of the information available to the eavesdropping Receiver K,
i.e., ZK , Xe. The rate achieved is R = H(z1, · · · , zK−1|zK)−maxq∈[1:K−1]H(z1, · · · , zK−1|zq, zK) =
minq∈[1:K−1]H(zq|zK) as L→∞.
7 Conclusion
We introduce the problem of secure groupcast, where a transmitter wishes to securely communicate
with a group of selected receivers while ensuring the other illegitimate receivers are fully ignorant
of the desired communication, through noiseless broadcasting and correlated keys.
The communication efficiency of secure groupcast is measured by the message rate (number of
message bits securely groupcast) and the broadcast bandwidth resource used (number of bits in the
transmit signal). The main emphasis is placed on the most elementary setting of combinatorial keys
and one common message, and limited extensions are also explored. Complete answers are obtained
for certain preliminary cases, e.g., one legitimate receiver or one eavesdropping receiver, symmetric
cases, while other cases remain unsolved. Interesting insights emerge out of this study, e.g., the
necessity of decomposition and both structured and generic coding, the quest for tighter general
converse bounds, and the potential of alignment view of the correlated key, message and transmit
signal spaces. We find secure groupcast to be an interesting and challenging information theoretic
security primitive with many open questions, and this work is a first step towards understanding
coding opportunities for group communications under multiple correlated eavesdroppers.
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